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Abstract. Convolutional Neural Networks have been shown to be vul-
nerable to adversarial examples, which are known to locate in subspaces
close to where normal data lies but are not naturally occurring and of
low probability. In this work, we investigate the potential effect defense
techniques have on the geometry of the likelihood landscape - likelihood
of the input images under the trained model. We first propose a way
to visualize the likelihood landscape leveraging an energy-based model
interpretation of discriminative classifiers. Then we introduce a measure
to quantify the flatness of the likelihood landscape. We observe that a
subset of adversarial defense techniques results in a similar effect of flat-
tening the likelihood landscape. We further explore directly regularizing
towards a flat landscape for adversarial robustness.
Keywords: Adversarial Robustness, Understanding Robustness, Deep
Learning
1 Introduction
Although Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have consistently pushed bench-
marks on several computer vision tasks, ranging from image classification [15],
object detection [8] to recent multimodal tasks such as visual question answer-
ing [1] and dialog [3], they are not robust to small adversarial input pertur-
bations. Prior work has extensively demonstrated the vulnerability of CNNs
to adversarial attacks [39,10,29,2,24] and has therefore, exposed how intrin-
sically unstable these systems are. Countering the susceptibility of CNNs to
such attacks has motivated a number of defenses in the computer vision litera-
ture [24,49,43,27,16,18,35,33].
In this work we explore the questions, why are neural networks vulnerable
to adversarial attacks in the first place, and how do adversarial defenses protect
against them? Are there some inherent deficiencies in vanilla neural network
training that these attacks exploit and that these defenses counter? To start
answering these questions, we explore how adversarial and clean samples fit into
the marginal input distributions of trained models. In doing so, we find that
although CNN classifiers implicitly model the distribution of the clean data
(both training and test), standard training induces a specific structure in this
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marginal distribution that adversarial attacks can exploit. Moreover, we find
that a subset of adversarial defense techniques, despite being wildly different
in motivation and implementation, all tend to modify this structure, leading to
more robust models.
A standard discriminative CNN-based classifier only explicitly models the
conditional distribution of the output classes with respect to the input image
(namely, pθ(y|x)). This is in contrast to generative models (such as GANs [9]),
which go a step further and model the marginal (or joint) distribution of the
data directly (namely, pθ(x) or pθ(x, y)), so that they can draw new samples from
that distribution or explain existing samples under the learned model. Recently,
however, Grathwohl et al. [12] have shown that it is possible to interpret a CNN
classifier as an energy-based model (EBM), allowing us to infer the conditional
(pθ(y|x)) as well as the marginal distribution (pθ(x)). While they use this trick
to encode generative capabilities into a discriminative classifier, we are interested
in exploring the marginal distribution of the input, pθ(x) for models trained with
and without adversarial defense mechanisms.
To do this, we study the “relative likelihood landscape” (∆ log pθ(x) in a
neighborhood around a test example), which lets us freely analyze this marginal
distribution. In doing so, we notice a worrying trend – for most training or test
examples, a small random perturbation in pixel space can cause the modeled
log pθ(x) to drop significantly (see Fig. 1a). Despite training and test samples
(predicted correctly by the model) being highly likely under the marginal data
distribution of the model (high log pθ(x)), slight deviations from these exam-
ples significantly moves the perturbed samples out of the high-likelihood region.
Whether this is because of dataset biases such as chromatic aberration [4] and
JPEG artifacts [38] or some other factor [40,6,17] isn’t clear. Yet, what is clear
is that adversarial examples exploit this property (see Fig. 3a). Moreover, we
observe that adversarial defenses intrinsically address this issue.
Specifically, we study two key adversarial defense techniques – namely ad-
versarial training [10,24,49] and Jacobian regularization [18,16]. Although these
defense mechanisms are motivated by different objectives, both of them re-
sult in elevating the value of log pθ(x) in the region surrounding training and
test examples. Thus, they all intrinsically tend to “flatten” the likelihood land-
scape, thereby patching the adversarially-exploitable structures in the network’s
marginal data distribution (see Fig. 1). Moreover, we find that the stronger the
adversarial defense, the more pronounced this effect becomes (see Fig. 2).
To quantify this perceived “flatness” of the likelihood landscapes, we build
on top of [12] and devise a new metric, Φ-flatness, that captures how rapidly the
marginal likelihood of clean samples change in their immediate neighborhoods.
As predicted by our qualitative observations, we find that stronger adversarial
defenses correlate well with higher Φ-flatness and a flatter likelihood landscape
(see Fig. 4). This supports the idea that deviations in the log pθ(x) landscape
are connected to what give rise to adversarial examples.
In order to fully test that hypothesis, we make an attempt to regularize
log pθ(x) directly, thereby explicitly enforcing this “flatness”. Our derivations
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(a) Standard training (b) Adv Training,  = 6 (c) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.05
Fig. 1: Relative likelihood landscapes (∆ log pθ(x)) plotted over two random perturba-
tion directions for three DDNet models trained on CIFAR10 with the clean sample
in the center. (a) follows standard training without additional defense. (b) uses PGD
based adversarial training for 10 iterations with  = 6/255. (c) uses Jacobian regu-
larization with a strength of λ = 0.05. Models trained to defend against adversarial
attacks tend to have much fatter landscapes.
indicate that regularizing log pθ(x) directly under this model is very similar to
Jacobian regularization. We call the resulting regularization scheme AMSReg
(based on the Approximate Mass Score proposed in [12]) and find that it results
in adversarial performance similar to Jacobian regularization. While this defense
ends up being less robust than adversarial training, we show that this may
simply be because adversarial training prioritizes smoothing out the likelihood
landscape in the directions chosen by adversarial attacks (see Fig. 5b) as opposed
to random chosen perturbations. The regularization methods, on the other hand,
tend to smooth out the likelihood in random directions very well, but are not
as successful in the adversarial directions (see Fig. 5). Concretely, we make the
following contributions:
– We propose a way to visualize the relative marginal likelihoods of input sam-
ples (clean as well as perturbed) under the trained discriminative classifier
by leveraging an interpretation of a CNN-based classifier as an energy-based
model.
– We show that the marginal likelihood of a sample drops significantly with
small pixel-level perturbations (Fig. 1a), and that adversarial examples lever-
age this property to attack the model (Fig. 3a).
– We empirically identify that a subset of standard defense techniques, in-
cluding adversarial training and Jacobian regularization, implicitly work to
“flatten” this marginal distribution, which addresses this issue (Fig. 1). The
stronger the defense, “flatter” the likelihood landscape (Fig. 2).
– We devise a method for regularizing the “flatness” of this likelihood land-
scape directly (called AMSReg) and arrive at a defense similar to Jacobian
regularization that works on par with existing defense methods.
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2 Related Work
Adversarial Examples and Attacks. Adversarial examples for CNNs were
originally introduced in Szegedy et al. [39], which shows that deep neural net-
works can be fooled by carefully-crafted imperceptible perturbations. These ad-
versarial examples locate in a subspace that is very close to the naturally occuring
data, but they have low probability in the original data distribution [23]. Many
works have then been proposed to explore ways finding adversarial examples
and attacking CNNs. Common attacks include FGSM [10], JSMA [29], C&W
[2], and PGD [24] which exploit the gradient in respect to the input to deceitfully
perturb images.
Adversarial Defenses. Several techniques have also been proposed to de-
fend against adversarial attacks. Some aim at defending models from attack
at inference time [13,46,14,35,33,28], some aim at detecting adversarial data in-
put [7,26,21,50,32], and others focus on directly training a model that is robust
to a perturbed input [24,49,43,27,16,18].
Among those that defend at training time, adversarial training [10,19,24] has
been the most prevalent direction. The original implementation of adversarial
training [10] generated adversarial examples using an FGSM attack and incorpo-
rated those perturbed images into the training samples. This defense was later
enhanced by Madry et al. [24] using the stronger projected gradient descent
(PGD) attack. However, running strong PGD adversarial training is computa-
tionally expensive and several recent works have focused on accelerating the
process by reducing the number of attack iterations [36,48,44].
Gradient regularization, on the other hand, adds an additional loss in at-
tempt to produce a more robust model [5,37,42,34,18,16]. Of these methods, we
consider Jacobian regularization, which tries to minimize the change in output
with respect to the change in input (i.e., the Jacobian). In Varga et al. [42], the
authors introduce an efficient algorithm to approximate the Frobenius norm of
the Jacobian. Hoffman et al. [16] later conducts comprehensive analysis on the
efficient algorithm and promotes Jacobian Regularization as a generic scheme
for increasing robustness.
Interpreting robustness via geometry of loss landscapes. In a similar
vein to our work, several works [25,31,47] have looked at the relation between
adversarial robustness and the geometry of loss landscapes. Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [25] shows that small curvature of loss landscape has strong relation to
large adversarial robustness. Yu et al. [47] qualitatively interpret neural network
models adversarial robustness through loss surface visualization. In this work,
instead of looking at loss landscapes, we investigate the relation between ad-
versarial robustness and the geometry of likelihood landscapes. The likelihood
landscape usually can’t be computed for discrimitive models, but given recent
work into interpreting neural network classifiers as energy-based models (EBMs)
[12], we can now study the likelihood of data samples under trained classifiers.
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3 Approach and Experiments
We begin our analysis of adversarial examples by exploring the marginal log-
likelihood distribution of a clean sample relative to perturbed samples in a sur-
rounding neighborhood (namely, the “relative likelihood landscape”). Next, we
describe how to quantify the “flatness” of the landscape and then describe a
regularization term in order to optimize for this “flatness”. Finally, we present
our experiment results and observations.
3.1 Computing the Marginal Log-Likelihood (log pθ(x))
As mentioned before, CNN-based classifiers are traditionally trained to model
the conditional, log pθ(y|x), and not the marginal likelihood of samples under
the model, log pθ(x) (where θ are the parameters of the model). To get around
this restriction, we leverage the interpretation presented by Grathwohl et al. [12],
which allows us to compute the marginal likelihood based on an energy-based
graphical model interpretation of discriminative classifiers. More specifically, let
fθ : RD → RK denote a classifier that maps input images to output pre-softmax
logits. Grathwohl et al. model the joint distribution of the input images x and
output labels y as:
pθ(x, y) =
exp(−Eθ(x, y))
Z(θ)
=
exp(fθ,y(x))
Z(θ)
, (1)
where Eθ(x, y) is known as the energy function, fθ,y(x) denotes the y
th index
of the logits, fθ(x), and Z(θ) =
∫
x
∫
y
exp(−Eθ(x, y)) is an unknown normalizing
constant (that depends only on the parameters, and not the input). The marginal
likelihood of an input sample x can therefore be obtained as,
log pθ(x) = log
∑
y
pθ(x, y) = log
(∑
y
exp (fθ,y(x))
)
− logZ(θ) . (2)
However, since Z(θ) involves integrating over the space of all images, it is in-
tractable to compute in practice. Thus, we focus on relative likelihoods instead,
where we can cancel out the logZ(θ) term. Specifically, given a perturbed sample
x′ and clean sample x, we define the relative likelihood of x′ w.r.t. x as
∆ log pθ(x
′) = log pθ(x′)− log pθ(x) =
∑
y
exp (fθ,y(x
′))−
∑
y
exp (fθ,y(x)) (3)
3.2 Relative Likelihood Landscape Visualization
We now describe how to utilize Eqn. 3 to visualize relative likelihood landscapes,
building on top of prior work focusing on visualizing loss-landscapes [11,22,47].
To make these plots, we visualize the relative likelihood with respect to a clean
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(a) Adv Training,  = 2 (b) Adv Training,  = 4 (c) Adv Training,  = 6
(d) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.01 (e) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.05 (f) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.1
Fig. 2: Relative likelihood landscapes for Adversarial Training and Jacobian regular-
ization with increasing strength. All models used DDNet trained on CIFAR10 and
adversarial training uses PGD for 10 iterations. We see that stronger defenses tend to
have have flatter landscapes.
sample in a surrounding neighborhood. Namely, for each point x′ in the neigh-
borhood N(x) surrounding a clean sample x, we plot ∆ log pθ(x
′).
Consistent with prior work, we define the neighborhood N(x) around a clean
sample as
N(x) = {x′|x′ = x+ 1d+ 2d⊥} (4)
where d and d⊥ are the two randomly pre-selected orthogonal signed vectors,
and 1 and 2 represent the perturbation intensity along the axes d and d
⊥.
Visualizing ∆ log p(x′) for samples x′ surrounding the clean sample x allows us
to understand the degree to which structured perturbations affect the likelihood
of the sample under the model.
Fig. 1 shows such visualizations on a typical test-time example for standard
training (no defense), adversarial training, and training with Jacobian regular-
ization. Note that while we show just one example in these figures, we observe
the same general trends over many samples. More examples of these plots can
be found in the Appendix. Then as shown in Fig. 1a, for standard training small
perturbations from the center clean image drops the likelihood of that sample
considerably. While likelihood doesn’t necessarily correlate one to one with accu-
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racy, it’s incredibly worrying that standard training doesn’t model data samples
that are slightly perturbed from test examples. Furthermore, these images are
test examples that the model hasn’t seen during training. This points to an un-
derlying dataset bias, since the model has high likelihood for exactly the test
example, but not for samples a small pixel perturbation away. This supports the
recent idea that adversarial examples might be more of a property of datasets
rather than the model themselves [17].
The rest of Fig. 1 shows that adversarial defenses like adversarial training and
Jacobian regularization tend to have a much more uniform likelihood distribu-
tion, where perturbed points have a similar likelihood to the clean sample (i.e.,
the likelihood landscape is “flat”). Moreover, we also observe in Fig. 2 that the
stronger the defense (for both adversarial training and Jacobian regularization),
the lower the variation in the resulting relative likelihood landscape. Specifically,
if we increase the adversarial training attack strength () or increase the Jaco-
bian regularization strength (λ), we observe a “flatter” likelihood landscape. We
measure this correlation quantitatively in Sec. 3.3.
To get an understanding of the impact different defenses have on the likeli-
hood of overall data distribution, we further plot the histogram of log pθ(x) for all
clean test samples and randomly perturbed samples near them (Fig. 3). Adver-
sarial training and Jacobian regularization share several common effects on the
log-likelihood distribution: (1) both techniques induce more aligned distribution
between clean samples and randomly perturbed samples (likely as a consequence
of likelihood landscape flattening). (2) both techniques tend to decrease the log-
likelihood of clean samples relatively to randomly perturbed samples. (3) The
stronger the regularization, the more left-skewed the log-likelihood distribution
of clean samples is.
3.3 Quantifying Flatness
To quantify the degree of variation in the likelihood landscape surrounding a
point, we use the Approximate Mass Score (AMS), which was originally intro-
duced in [12] as an out of distribution detection score. AMS depends on how
the marginal likelihood changes in the immediate neighborhood of a point in the
input space. The Approximate Mass Score can be expressed as,
sθ(x) = −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂ log pθ(x)∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
F
(5)
We use the gradient for all x′ ∈ N(x) as an indicator of the “flatness” of the
likelihood landscape surrounding the clean sample. While log pθ(x) is intractable
to compute in practice, we can compute ∂ log pθ(x)∂x exactly,
∂ log pθ(x)
∂x
=
∂
∂x
log
(∑
y exp (fθ,y(x))
Z(θ)
)
=
∑
y
pθ(y|x)∂fθ,y(x)
∂x
(6)
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(a) Standard Training (b) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.01
(c) Adversarial Training (AT),  = 2 (d) Adversarial Training (AT),  = 5
Fig. 3: Histograms of log-likelihood log pθ(x) for clean samples and randomly perturbed
samples. Blue corresponds to the log-likelihood on clean samples in CIFAR10 while
orange corresponds to the log-likelihood on the perturbed samples. Note that the x-
axis for plots might be differently shifted due to the different unknown normalizing
constant Z(θ) for each model, but the scale of x-axis are the same across plots. (a)
visualizes DDNet trained without additional defense, (b) uses a Jacobian regularized
DDNet and (c)(d) use DDNet trained using PGD based adversarial training for 10
iterations. We see in adversarially robust approaches, clean and perturbed samples
have more aligned distributions. We also note that with stronger regularization the
distributions become increasingly left-skewed.
To quantify the flatness in the surrounding area of x, we sample this quantity
at each point in the neighborhood of x (see Eq. 4) and average over n random
choices for d and d⊥ to obtain:
φ(x) =
n∑
j=1
∑
x′∈Nj(x)
sθ(x)
n
=
n∑
j=1
∑
x′∈Nj(x)
−1
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂ log pθ(x′)∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
F
(7)
The flatness of likelihood landscape for a model is then calculated by aver-
aging φ(x) for all testing samples.
Φ =
N∑
i=1
φ(xi)
N
(8)
Fig. 4 shows the relationship between flatness score Φ and defense strength. For
both adversarial training (Fig. 4a) and Jacobian regularization (Fig. 4b), the
stronger the defense, the lower the score and the higher the adversarial accuracy.
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(a) Adversarial training (b) Jacobian regularization
Fig. 4: Visualizes the relationship between the likelihood landscape flatness (as defined
by Eqn. 8) and adversarial accuracy. (a) showcases DDNet trained on CIFAR10 us-
ing PGD based adversarial training for 10 iterations with increasing epsilon strength.
(b) showcases DDNet trained on CIFAR10 using Jacobian regularization of increas-
ing strength. We see that adversarial accuracy and flatness of the relative likelihood
landscape are correlated in the case of both defenses.
This observation motivates us to explore directly regularizing this AMS term
(AMSReg) to induce a flat likelihood landscape.
3.4 Approximate Mass Score Regularization (AMSReg)
In our experiments, we observe that high adversarial robustness corresponds
with a low Approximate Mass Score in the case of both adversarial training and
Jacobian regularization. This begs the question, is it possible to improve adver-
sarial robustness by directly regularizing this term? That is, can we regularize∣∣∣∣∣∣∂ log pθ(x)∂x ∣∣∣∣∣∣2
F
directly in addition to the cross-entropy loss to encourage robust
predictive performance? Note however that naively computing this term during
training would require double backpropagation, which would be inefficient.
Instead we make the observation that the right hand side of Eqn. 6 (used to
compute ∂ log pθ(x)∂x ) is reminiscent of gradient regularization techniques – specif-
ically, Jacobian Regularization [16].
Connection with Jacobian Regularization [16]. As discussed in [16], Jaco-
bian regularization traditionally emerges as a consequence of stability analysis
of model predictions against input perturbations – the high-level idea being that
small input perturbations should minimally affect the predictions made by a
network up to a first order Taylor expansion. Hoffman et al. [16] characterize
this by regularizing the Jacobian of the output logits with respect to the input
images. The difference between each element being summed over in the right
hand side of Eqn. 6 and the input-output Jacobian term used in [16] is that now
the Jacobian term is weighted by the predicted probability of each class. Namely,
optimizing
∣∣∣∣∣∣∂ log pθ(x)∂x ∣∣∣∣∣∣2
F
results in regularizing ||∑c pθ(c | x)∂fθ,c(x)∂x ||2F , while
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Jacobian regularization regularizes just ||∂fθ,c(x)∂x ||2F . The following proposition
provides an upper bound of the squared norm that can be efficiently calculated
in batch when using the efficient algorithm proposed for Jacobian regularization
in [16].
Proposition 3.1. Let C denote the number of classes, and Jw(x) = pθ(c |
x)
∂fθ,c(x)
∂xi
be a weighted variant of the Jacobian of the class logits with respect to
the input. Then, the frobenius norm of Jw(x) multiplied by the total number of
classes upper bounds the AMS score:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂ log pθ(x)∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
F
≤ C ||Jw(x)||2F (9)
Proof. Recall that as per the EBM [12] interpretation of a discriminative clas-
sifier, ∂ log pθ(x)∂x can be expressed as,
∂ log pθ(x)
∂x
=
∂
∂x
log
(∑
y exp (fθ,y(x))
Z(θ)
)
(10)
=
∂
∂x
log
∑
y
exp(fθ,y(x)) (11)
=
∑
y
exp(fθ,y(x))∑
y exp(fθ,y(x))
∂fθ,y(x)
∂x
(12)
(13)
Or,
∂ log pθ(x)
∂x
=
∑
y
pθ(y | x)∂fθ,y(x)
∂x
(14)
We utilize the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, as stated below to obtain an upper
bound on ∂ log pθ(x)∂x
(
N∑
k=1
ukvk)
2 ≤ (
N∑
k=1
u2k)(
N∑
k=1
v2k) (15)
where uk, vk ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. If we set uk = 1 for all k, the inequality
reduces to,
(
N∑
k=1
vk)
2 ≤ N(
N∑
k=1
v2k) (16)
Since, Jwy,i(x) ∈ R, we have,
(
C∑
y=1
Jwy,i(x))
2 ≤ C
C∑
y=1
(Jwy,i(x))
2 (17)
where C is the total number of output classes. This implies that,
∑
i
(
C∑
y=1
Jwy,i(x))
2 ≤ C
∑
i
C∑
y=1
(Jwy,i(x))
2 (18)
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Or, ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂ log pθ(x)∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
F
≤ C ||Jw(x)||2F (19)
To summarize, the overall objective we optimize for a mini-batchB = {(x, y)}|B|i=1
using AMSReg can be expressed as,
LJoint(B; θ) =
∑
(x,y)∈B
LCE(x, y; θ) + µ
2
[
1
|B|
∑
x∈B
||Jw(x)||2F
]
(20)
where LCE(x, y; θ) is the standard cross-entropy loss function and µ is a hyper-
parameter that determines the strength of regularization.
Efficient Algorithm for AMSReg. Hoffman et al., [16] introduce an effi-
cient algorithm to calculate the Frobenius norm of the input-output Jacobian
(Jy,i(x) =
∂fθ,y(x)
∂xi
) using random projection as,
||J(x)||2F = CEvˆ∼SC−1 [||vˆ · J ||2] (21)
where C is the total number of output classes and vˆ is random vector drawn
from the (C− 1)-dimensional unit sphere SC−1. ||J(x)||2F can then be efficiently
approximated by sampling random vectors as,
||J(x)||2F ≈
1
nproj
nproj∑
µ=1
[
∂(vˆµ · z)
∂x
]2 (22)
where nproj is the number of random vectors drawn and z is the output vector
(see Section 2.3 [16] for more details). In AMSReg, we optimize the square of
the Frobenius norm of Jw(x) where:
Jwy,i(x) = pθ(y | x)
∂fθ,y(x)
∂xi
(23)
Since Jw(x) can essentially be expressed as a matrix product of a diagonal matrix
of predicted class probabilities and the regular Jacobian matrix, we are able to
re-use the efficient random projection algorithm by expressing ||Jw(x)||2F as,
||Jw(x)||2F = CEvˆ∼SC−1 [||vˆT diag(pθ(c | x))J(x)||2] (24)
3.5 Experiments with AMSReg
We run our experiments on the CIFAR-10 and Fashion-MNIST datasets [45].
We compare AMSReg against both Adversarial Training (AT) [24] and Jacobian
Regularization (Jacobian Reg.) [16]. We perform our experiments across three
network architectures – LeNet [20], DDNet [30] and ResNet18 [15]. We train
each model for 200 epochs using piecewise learning rate decay (i.e. decay ten-
fold after the 100th and 150th epoch). All models are optimized using SGD with
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Table 1: Experiments on CIFAR10: flatness Φ and accuracies(%) on clean and adver-
sarial test samples. PGD attacks are generated with  = 8/255, steps=5 and a step size
of 2/255. AMSReg is able to achieve the highest Φ-Flatness while adversarial training
is the most robust defense.
Defense Φ (Flatness ↑) Clean-Acc. ↑ (%) Adversarial-Acc. ↑ (%) (PGD)
D
D
N
et
[3
0
] No Defense −13035.5 91.45 1.7
AT ( = 3/255) −2066.4 85.90 45.71
Jacobian Reg. [16] (λ = 0.05) −1692.6 86.06 18.31
AMSReg (λ = 1.0) −768.7 85.45 20.78
R
N
-1
8
[1
5
] No Defense −13974.3 94.69 0.1
AT ( = 3/255) −1055.0 85.32 57.48
Jacobian Reg. [16] (λ = 0.05) −1945.1 82.28 14.73
AMSReg (λ = 1.0) −659.5 86.94 11.07
Table 2: Experiments on Fashion-MNIST: flatness Φ and accuracies(%) on clean and
adversarial test samples. PGD attacks are generated with  = 25/255, steps=10 and a
step size of 6.25/255. AMSReg is able to achieve the highest Φ-Flatness while adver-
sarial training is the most robust defense.
Defense Φ (Flatness ↑) Clean-Acc. ↑ (%) Adversarial-Acc. ↑ (%) (PGD)
L
eN
et
[2
0
] No Defense −9435.9 91.53 0.0
AT ( = 10/255) −1504.0 89.35 62.64
Jacobian Reg. [16] (λ = 0.01) −1694.6 88.76 34.71
AMSReg (λ = 0.5) −378.1 89.51 34.04
R
N
-1
8
[1
5
] No Defense −12952.8 93.75 0.1
AT ( = 10/255) −1257.8 91.64 65.24
Jacobian Reg. [16] (λ = 0.01) −821.7 91.04 45.37
AMSReg (λ = 0.5) −482.9 91.29 46.06
a momentum factor of 0.9. Adversarial training models are trained with 10 steps
of PGD. When evaluating adversarial robustness, we use an l∞ bounded 5-steps
PGD attack with  = 8/255 and a step size of 2/255 for models trained on
CIFAR10 and a 10-step PGD attack with  = 25/255 and a step size of 6.25/255
for models trained on Fashion-MNIST.
Results and Analysis. Table 1 and Table 2 show the results of AMSReg
compared to adversarial training and Jacobian regularization on CIFAR10 and
Fashion-MNIST. It is known that there is a trade-off between adversarial ro-
bustness and accuracy [49,41]. Therefore, here we only compare models that
have similar accuracy on clean test images. As observed in Table 1 and 2, mod-
els trained with AMSReg indeed have flatter likelihood landscapes than Jaco-
bian regularization and adversarial training, indicating that the regularization
was successful. Furthermore, AMSReg models have comparable adversarial ro-
bustness to that of Jacobian regularization. However, they are still significantly
susceptible to adversarial attacks than adversarial training.
We conduct further analysis by looking at the flatness along the attack direc-
tions (i.e., the direction an FGSM attack chosen to perturb the image) instead
of random directions. Fig. 5 shows the likelihood landscape projected using one
Likelihood Landscapes 13
FGSM direction and one random direction. Interestingly enough, both Jacobian
and AMS regularization are able to flatten the landscape in the random direction
well (with AMS being slightly flatter than Jacobian). However, neither regular-
ization method is able to flatten out the FGSM attack direction nearly as much
as adversarial training. This might explain why neither AMS nor Jacobian reg-
ularization are able to match the adversarial robustness of adversarial training.
We leave the next step of flattening out the worst-case directions (i.e. the attack
directions) for future work.
(a) Standard training (b) Adv Train,  = 6 (c) AMSReg, λ = 1 (d) Jacobian, λ = 0.1
Fig. 5: Relative likelihood landscapes projected using one FGSM direction (dir FGSM)
and a random direction (dir2). Each visualization uses DDNet trained on CIFAR10.
(a) uses standard training with no defense, (b) is adversarially trained with a 10-step
PGD attack, (c) uses AMSReg with λ = 1, and (d) uses Jacobian Regularization with
λ = 0.1. We see that adversarial training is able to flatten the likelihood landscape in
the FGSM direction much more than the regularization defenses.
4 Conclusion
In this work, we explore why neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks from a perspective of the marginal distribution of the inputs (images)
under the trained model. We first suggest a way to visualize the likelihood land-
scape of CNNs by leveraging the recently proposed EBM interpretation of a
discriminatively learned classifier. Qualitatively, we show that a subset of stan-
dard defense techniques such as adversarial training and Jacobian regularization
share a common pattern: they induce flat likelihood landscapes. We then quan-
titatively show this correlation by introducing a measure regarding the flatness
of the likelihood landscape in the surrounding area of clean samples. We also
explore directly regularizing a term that encourages flat likelihood landscapes,
but this results in worse adversarial robustness than adversarial training and
is roughly comparable to just Jacobian regularization. After further analysis,
we find that adversarial training significantly flattens the likelihood landscape
in the directions abused by adversarial attacks. The regularization methods, on
the other hand, are better at flattening the landscape in random directions.
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These findings suggest that flattening the likelihood landscape is important for
adversarial robustness, but it’s most important for the landscape to be flat in
the directions chosen by adversarial attacks.
Overall, our findings in this paper provide a new perspective of adversarial
robustness as flattening the likelihood landscape and show how different defenses
and regularization techniques address this similar core deficiency. We leave de-
signing a regularizer that flattens the likelihood landscape in attack directions
for future investigation.
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A Appendix
In this section, we first provide some details on the efficient algorithm used
to compute AMSReg (see Section 3.4, main paper) during training. Next, we
present some additional examples of our relative likelihood landscape visualiza-
tion.
A.1 Details on the efficient algorithm implementation for AMSReg.
Hoffman et al., [16] introduce an efficient algorithm to calculate the Frobenius
norm of the input-output Jacobian (Jy,i(x) =
∂fθ,y(x)
∂xi
) using random projection
as,
||J(x)||2F = CEvˆ∼SC−1 [||vˆ · J ||2] (25)
where C is the total number of output classes and vˆ is random vector drawn
from the (C− 1)-dimensional unit sphere SC−1. ||J(x)||2F can then be efficiently
approximated by sampling random vectors as,
||J(x)||2F ≈
1
nproj
nproj∑
µ=1
[
∂(vˆµ · z)
∂x
]2 (26)
where nproj is the number of random vectors drawn and z is the output vector
(see Section 2.3 [16] for more details). In AMSReg, we optimize the square of
the Frobenius norm of Jw(x) where:
Jwy,i(x) = pθ(y | x)
∂fθ,y(x)
∂xi
(27)
Since Jw(x) can essentially be expressed as a matrix product of a diagonal matrix
of predicted class probabilities and the regular Jacobian matrix, we are able to
re-use the efficient random projection algorithm by expressing ||Jw(x)||2F as,
||Jw(x)||2F = CEvˆ∼SC−1 [||vˆT diag(pθ(c | x))J(x)||2] (28)
A.2 More examples of likelihood landscape visualization
We show more examples of relative likelihood landscape visualization that are
similar to Fig. 2 in the main paper but are for different test samples and network
architectures. Concretely, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 shows the relative likelihood land-
scapes for two test samples of CIFAR10 using DDNet [30] model trained with
different defenses. Fig. 8 shows the relative likelihood landscapes for one test
sample of CIFAR10 using ResNet18 [15] model trained with different defenses.
Overall, we can see that stronger defenses tend to have flatter landscapes.
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(a) Standard training (b) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.01 (c) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.1
(d) Adv Training,  = 2 (e) Adv Training,  = 4 (f) Adv Training,  = 8
Fig. 6: Relative likelihood landscapes for Adversarial Training and Jacobian regular-
ization with increasing strength. All models used DDNet trained on CIFAR10 and
adversarial training uses PGD for 10 iterations.
Likelihood Landscapes 19
(a) Standard training (b) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.01 (c) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.1
(d) Adv Training,  = 2 (e) Adv Training,  = 4 (f) Adv Training,  = 8
Fig. 7: Relative likelihood landscapes for Adversarial Training and Jacobian regular-
ization with increasing strength. All models used DDNet trained on CIFAR10 and
adversarial training uses PGD for 10 iterations.
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(a) Standard training (b) Adv Training,  = 1 (c) Adv Training,  = 3
(d) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.01 (e) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.05 (f) Jacobian Reg, λ = 0.1
Fig. 8: Relative likelihood landscapes for Adversarial Training and Jacobian regular-
ization with increasing strength. All models used ResNet18 trained on CIFAR10 and
adversarial training uses PGD for 10 iterations.
